150-years-ago -- THE INITIAL ASSAULTS ON VICKSBURG

First at Vicksburg

Confederate Lines, Vicksburg, Mississippi, 19 May 1863. In this assault against bitter resistance the 1st Battalion, 13th Infantry, lost forty-three percent of its men, but of the attacking force, it alone fought its color up the steep slope to the top. General Sherman called its performance "unequalled in the Army" and authorized the 13th Infantry to inscribe "First at Vicksburg" on its color. Although it took two more months of hard fighting to capture Vicksburg and split the Confederacy, no episode illustrates better the indomitable spirit of Americans on both sides. (U.S. Army Military History)

[Excerpted from National Park Service

Publication, “Vicksburg: The  Opening

Of the Mississippi 1862-63"]

Artillery positions and forts (lunettes, redans, and

redoubts) had been constructed at salient and com-

manding points along the exterior line. The earth

parapets of the forts were up to 20 feet thick. In

front of most of these the Confederates had dug a

deep, wide ditch so that any assaulting troops who

managed to reach the work would still have a high

steep wall to climb to get into it. Lines of rifle-pits or

entrenchments, for the most part protected by para-

pets and ditches, covered the ground between the

strong points. Where spurs jutted out from the main

ridges, forward artillery batteries provided a deadly

crossfire against attacking lines. During the early

phase of the siege, the Confederates mounted as

many as 115 cannon (including a few heavy siege

guns) along the defense perimeter. The River Batter-

ies contained an additional 31 heavy guns and s(Mnc

field pieces.

The area's topography greatly strengthened the

Confederate position. Over the centuries, running

water had eroded the region's soil into deep gullies

and ravines, creating a broken and complicated

terrain that seriously obstructed Union movements.

The Confederates had cut down most of the trees

fronting their lines to permit a clear field of fire and

to further hinder advancing troops. Several hundred

yards away, roughly parallel to the Confederate

position, was a ridge system not so continuous and

more broken than that occupied by Pemberton's

army. Along this line the Union army would eventu-

ally take position and begin siege operations.

Maj. Gen. Martin Luther Smith
(Library of Congress)

The two men most responsible for fort if ring Vicksburg

were Maj. Gen. Martin Luther Smith who had previously helped to plan the

defenses of New Orleans, and his chief engineer, Maj. Samuel H. Lockett. At

the time of Farragut's 1862 naval attack. Smith was Vicksburg 's commanding officer. During the 1862 siege, he commanded Pemberton 's left wing.

On the scattered natural bridges of high ground

spanning the ravines, six roads and one railroad

entered Vicksburg. To guard these access points, the

Confederates had constructed nine defensive works-

Fort Hill on the river north of the city. Stockade

Redan, Third Louisiana Redan, Great Redoubt,

Second Texas Lunette, Railroad Redoubt, Fort Gar-

rott (also known as Square Fort), Salient Work, and

South Fort on the river below Vicksburg. The Con-

federate divisions defending the city were, north to

south, those commanded by Maj. Gen. Martin L.

Smith, Maj. Gen. John H. Forney, and Maj. General

Stevenson. Maj. General Bowen's division was held

in reserve. The Army of Vicksburg at the beginning

of the siege numbered about 31 ,000 men. Grant listed

his strength, shortly after the siege began, at 50,000.

By midday of May 19 [Maj. Gen. U.S.] Grant had deployed 20,000

of those troops behind Vicksburg. In the north, Sher-

man's corps was in position opposite the Confederate

left, extending from the river (at the present loca-

tion of the national cemetery) to Graveyard Road.

McPherson's corps, on Sherman's left, stretched

from near Graveyard Road to near Baldwin's Ferry

Road, while the front of McClernand's corps ex-

tended from Baldwin's Ferry Road southward toward

the Square Fort. About 500 yards separated the

opposing armies.

Grant had had little opportunity to assess the

strength of the Vicksburg defenses because Confed-

erate skirmishers had slowed his army's approach,

thus preventing a close inspection of the Southern

fortifications. Nevertheless, the Union commander

decided to launch an immediate attack, reasoning

that the longer he waited the stronger those defenses

would become. He ordered an assault for 2 p.m. on

the 19th.

[Maj. Gen. W.T.] Sherman's troops, whose early arrival had enabled

Grant to launch the attack, advanced under heavy

fire against the Confederate left. Although they got

close to the works, they failed to breach the defenses

and withdrew. McPherson and McClernand, not yet

in good position for attack, could do little more than

advance several hundred yards closer to the de-

fense line. Grant lost 1,000 men testing the Vicks-

burg defenses and discovered an unyielding army

manning the works. Confederate losses were slight.

Although the probing operation of the 19th had

failed, Grant did not despair but continued to ponder

what important results a successful assault would

achieve. Such a move, however costly, would save a

long siege. In the end, fewer men might be lost, and

a growing threat to the Union rear— General [J.E.] John-

ston raising troops near Jackson for the relief of

Vicksburg— could be eliminated by quickly capturing

Vicksburg and throwing the entire Union strength

against Johnston. In addition, the Federal troops,

spirited by recent victories and impatient to seize the

prize for which they had campaigned so long, would

work more zealously in the trenches with pick and

shovel if they were certain that a siege was the only

alternative. With 40,000 troops available. Grant is-

sued orders on the 21st for another assault against

Vicksburg the following day.

Pvt. Thomas Booker of Company B,
28th (Thomas') Louisiana Infantry, helped
stop the Federal assaults at several
different points on the defense line.
(Liljenquist Family Collection, Library of
Congress).

The Union assault of May 22 was centered against the Confederate line along a front from a point midway between Fort Hill and Stockade Redan to Square Fort. The felled trees and thick undergrowth, as well as the precipitous faces of the ravines, restricted the scope of Union maneuver. In preparation for the attack, field batteries were run forward and emplaced to provide a covering fire for the infantry, and troops were advanced into concealed posi-

tions—in places within 200 yards of their objective. To prevent Pemberton from shifting his forces from one threatened point to another, the infantry attacks were to begin simultaneously at 10 a.m. Watches of all Union commanders were synchronized. Reserves were posted to exploit a breakthrough.

The attack on the Stockade Redan by Maj. Gen.

Francis P. Blair's division of Sherman's corps exemplified the day's action in method and result. Blair's men were faced with formidable obstacles: the route of advance along the Graveyard Road was covered by Confederate fire, and access to the redan itself was rendered difficult by steep exterior slopes and

by a deep ditch fronting the works. The night before,

Sherman had decided that a bridge would be needed

by his men to span the ditch. Only one source of

lumber could be found — a frame house in which

General Grant was sleeping. Informed of the need.

Grant dressed and watched the house quickly torn

down for bridging material.

At the stroke of 10, the artillery bombardment of

the fortifications ceased and the "Forlorn Hope," a

volunteer band of 150 men, surged along Graveyard

Road toward the redan. They carried planks to

bridge the ditch and ladders to scale the steep

exterior slope. The Confederates held their fire until

the column issued from a cut in the road 400 feet

away. Then the Southern soldiers "rose from their

reclining position behind the works, and gave them

such a terrible volley of musketry" that the road

soon was nearly obstructed by the bodies of the

killed and wounded, "the very sticks and chips

scattered over the ground jumping under the hot

shower of Rebel bullets."

A Federal color-bearer managed to place a flag on

the exterior slope. The galling fire forced the rem-

nants of attack formations that had reached the

redan to take cover in the ditch. Attempting to pre-

vent the defenders from firing down into the ditch.

Federal infantry swept the top of the redan with

withering volleys. The Confederates fought back,

using artillery shells as hand grenades and rolling

them down among the Union troops pinned in the

ditch. In the face of ferocious resistance, the morn-

ing attack ground to a halt at the Stockade Redan.

Union flags were also placed on the slopes of the

Railroad Redoubt, the Great Redoubt, and at the

rifle-pits near the Second Texas Lunette. At the

Railroad Redoubt a tenuous breach was made in the

Confederate defenses by McClernand's troops. A

small band of lowans led by Sgts. Joseph Griffith and

Nicholas Messenger crawled through a gap blasted

by Union artillery at the salient angle, entered the

redoubt, and drove out most of the remaining de-

fenders. Later a dozen Confederates inside the re-

doubt surrendered. Other Federal troops clung to

the slopes or took cover in the ditch.

Encouraged by his partial success, McClernand

asked Grant for reinforcements and a renewal of the

attacks. One of McPherson's divisions marched to

augment McClernand's striking power. Grant or-

dered Sherman and McPherson to create a diversion

in McClernand's favor. All assaults in the afternoon

were shattered by a resolute Confederate defense.

The afternoon attacks, the last massive assault 

against Vicksburg, served only to increase Federal 

losses and to intensify an already bitter contro- 

versy over McClernand's military performance. 

Union casualties on May 22 totaled 3,200. A month 

later McClernand was replaced by Maj. Gen. Ed- 

ward O.C.Ord. Confederate casualties were comparatively

light.

National Park Service